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Should governments in Europe be more aggressive in  
pushing for gender equality to raise fertility?  





This paper takes the “no” side in the debate on the question posed in the title. The paper 
assumes that the dual-earner/dual-carer household model is the most likely aim of 
policies that push aggressively for gender equality in order to raise fertility. Five 
objections are discussed: the model does not necessarily lead to a fertility increase; 
aggressiveness will lead to an imbalance of labor supply and demand, and is likely to 
confront slowly changing cultural norms; similar policies will also confront the issue of 
innate gender differences; and country idiosyncrasies prevent the application of a 
unified policy approach. The paper briefly concludes that compatible gender-neutral 
family policies and fertility-neutral gender policies are likely to lead to an increase in 
fertility.  
 
1 This is the first of two “no” positions taken from the “Rostock Debate on Demographic Change” held  
at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research on 21 February 2006.  
2 Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: dimiter.philipov@oeaw.ac.at  Philipov: Rostock Debate, first NO: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality 
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1. Introduction  
Many countries in Europe have considerable experience in the implementation of 
policies that aim to increase fertility, and of policies that seek to promote gender 
equality. Over the last two decades, these two policy fields have attracted interest 
among scientists and policy makers, particularly because gender issues are considered 
to be among the obstacles to having children. It is argued that the incompatibility of 
career and family for women is among the main reasons for contemporary low fertility. 
It is also argued that the effect of this incompatibility can be significantly reduced 
through a transition from the classical male breadwinner model to the dual-earner/dual-
carer model.  
In this paper, I first discuss a central intersection between gender equality policies 
and family policies (including policies which aim to increase fertility): namely, the 
reconciliation of work and family roles. Next, I raise several objections to the opinion 
that the dual-earner/dual-carer model is a convenient solution to the dilemma, and 
emphasize that governmental intervention can be of low efficiency. I conclude that an 
efficient increase in fertility can be achieved when family policies are gender-neutral, 
and when gender equality policies are fertility-neutral.  
 
 
2. The intersection between family policies and gender equality 
    policies  
Pronatalistic family policies have dominated in the ex-socialist countries before the start 
of the transition (Debroy 1989). They were found to have a moderate effect on the level 
of fertility, in that, during the years after their implementation, births increased by 
around 10% (Büttner and Lutz 1990, showed this for the GDR, Philipov 1993, for 
Bulgaria and Stloukal 1998, for Czechoslovakia). Family policies were also 
implemented in other European countries. Although their main aim is to support 
families, they have an indirect effect on fertility, since the main instruments of a family 
policy, such as child allowances and parental leaves, were also the main instruments in 
the pronatalistic policies (see, for example, Rønsen and Skrede 2008).
3 In an 
international comparative framework, Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) found a moderate 
positive effect of family policies on fertility. Policies aiming at higher fertility have 
been long-standing in France, and their positive effect is well-known (Pailhé, Rossier, 
and Toulemon 2008). Also well-known are the positive effects on fertility of family 
 
3 For this reason, the differentiation between family policies and pro-natalistic policies is not of significance 
in this paper.  Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 8 
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policies implemented in social democratic welfare regimes in the Nordic countries (see 
Björklund 2006, and Andersson 2008 for Sweden, and Rønsen and Skrede 2008, for the 
Nordic countries). In general, family policies may bring about a moderately higher 
fertility level (Gauthier and Philipov 2008). A major problem with the implementation 
of family policies is that some of the key policy instruments, such as child allowances, 
are expensive, and a large number of European countries cannot afford their long-term 
implementation at levels that are commensurate with parental spending on child care 
and nurture (Gauthier 2007).  
Gender equality has been the subject of extensive discussions about the 
achievement of human rights and contemporary democratic values, particularly where 
the rights of women are considered. The topic became “hot” during the 1960s, when it 
was acknowledged that gender discrimination was a fact in the societies of the time. 
The legal system underwent a corresponding adjustment; a well-known example is the 
“equal opportunities” act adopted in many European countries decades ago. When 
compared with society of the 1960s, equal opportunities were indeed achieved in many 
spheres of contemporary European societies. However, from the contemporary point-
of-view, gender equality is still not satisfactory. In some spheres, such as in the labor 
market, gender inequality is apparent when practices, not laws, are considered. For 
example, pregnancy can be an obstacle to the employment of women in some countries, 
and the gender wage gap is persistent throughout Europe. The restriction of bad 
practices can be achieved with specific policies for the enhancement of gender equality. 
It has, however, been found to be more effective to consider and, if necessary, to 
introduce the gender equality issue in any legal act or social policy. The latter approach 
is known as gender mainstreaming, and it has been extensively advocated since the 
mid-1990s by international bodies such as the United Nations, The Council of Europe, 
the European Union (see for example the site of the Council of Europe: 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Equality/02._Gender_mainstreaming/  
or the paper available at that site: Council of Europe 1998).  
Mainstreaming gender as a constituent of contemporary policy making may have a 
variety of effects on fertility. For example, gender equality with respect to employment 
and payment of labor causes a rise in the opportunity costs of children for women, and, 
hence, following the economic theory of fertility (Becker 1991), will have a negative 
impact on fertility. Inversely, a decrease in uncertainty through higher security in the 
employment of pregnant women or of mothers exemplifies an effect that is likely to 
bring about a rise in fertility. The latter type of positive effect is a “by-product” of the 
relevant policy; i.e., an indirect policy effect. Our “no” does not relate to outcomes of 
gender-related policies that lead only indirectly to an increase in fertility. However, 
since a negative gender policy impact on births conflicts with family policies, these Philipov: Rostock Debate, first NO: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality 
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policies need adjustments to achieve inter-policy consistency. The latter topic has so far 
attracted relatively little attention among scientists and policy makers. 
The conflict between work and family roles is an important intersection between 
family policies and gender equality policies. In families with children, it is known as the 
“work and nurture” dilemma. The conflict is particularly relevant to families with both 
spouses/partners present, because spouses have a wider range of opportunities for time 
allocation; i.e., for the distribution of the household chores. The latter distribution is an 
issue of gender equality. A successful solution to the conflict is one that gives more 
opportunities to women to participate in the labor market, while allowing them 
sufficient time for their children and families. The conflict has become more transparent 
over the last couple of decades, when ideational changes included an increase in the 
desire among women for autonomy, self-realization, and self-establishment (Lesthaeghe 
1995). To this end, women increasingly prefer having a career to staying at home and 
doing the household chores. The conflict between work and family roles became the 
focus of both family and gender equality policies. Contemporary family policies include 
specific instruments designed to ease burdens on working parents, such as the 
promotion of paternity leave, even though in practice this form of leave has gained 
ground in relatively few countries up to now (see Figure 3 in Gauthier and Philipov 
2008). Meanwhile, gender policies apply diverse instruments to promote the transition 
from the classical breadwinner model to the contemporary dual-earner/dual-carer 
model. I discuss these models in the next section.  
 
 
3. The dual-earner / dual-career model as an optimal solution  
Participation in labor and family roles take diverse forms when both spouses (or 
partners in a non-marital union) are present in the family. Two models encompass most 
of this diversity: the male breadwinner model and the dual-earner model (discussed by 
Lewis 1992, in the framework of gender regimes), which are outlined below.  
A.  The male breadwinner model. The man works full time and allocates little time 
to supporting household work, while the woman does not work for pay and takes over 
the household responsibilities. A specific version is the female breadwinner model in 
which the roles of the man and the woman are reversed; since this model is rare, I do 
not consider it in the present discussion.  
B. The  dual-earner  model, in which both partners work. In one version of the 
model (The dual-earner/dual-carer model, woman full-time earner) both partners share 
equally paid work and work in the household. Another version is one in which the 
woman works part-time, and hence the partners share paid work and work in the 
household unequally (the dual-earner/dual-carer model, woman part-time earner). I Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 8 
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discuss these models later. Yet another version of the dual-earner model is widely seen 
as supporting gender inequality: the dual-earner/woman-carer model, in which both 
partners engage in paid work, but it is the woman who takes over the bulk of the 
household work. I will not discuss this model because, regardless of its relevance to 
fertility, governments and society should do their best to discourage it as a source of 
contemporary gender inequality.  
The male breadwinner model represents the traditional distribution of labor in the 
household. Recent decades have seen a transition from this model towards the dual-
earner model, as has been described and analyzed in a vast body of literature (see for 
example Lewis 2001, Pascal and Lewis 2004, Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001). The 
transition marked the emergence and rise of new models, such as the varieties of the 
dual-earner model specified above. Typologies of these models have recently been 
suggested (Crompton 1999, Haas 2005).  
The dual-earner/dual-carer model, in the version in which both partners share the 
household chores equally, is advocated as the preferred model for the balance of work 
and parenthood (Gornick and Meyers, 2003), particularly in countries with a social 
democratic type of welfare regime, and where public child care is widely available 
(Rønsen and Skrede 2008). The strength of this model is two-fold. On the one hand, it 
ensures a gender-egalitarian, gender-symmetrical distribution of labor and 
responsibilities in the family. On the other hand, from the child’s perspective, it ensures 
that both parents spend time with their child (or children). The model is considered as 
optimal both in cases where the woman is engaged in full-time paid work, and when her 
engagement is part-time.  
Hence, the dual-earner/dual-carer model of distribution of labor in the family is 
superior to other models with respect to childrearing, and it may be expected that, 
following the question of this debate, European governments should aggressively 
support the transition to this model.  
 
 
4. Empirical observations  
Before discussing these models further, it is helpful to consider some empirical 
illustrations. Table 1 gives the average number of hours worked per week in the 
household, as reported by women below age 40 who reside with a partner in a non-
marital partnership. Since time spent on child care depends on the number of children, it 
is excluded in the estimation in order to achieve higher comparability across countries.  Philipov: Rostock Debate, first NO: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality 
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Table 1:  Weekly hours spent on household work (mean); responses of females 
below age 40 with a steady non-marital partner; time spent on child 
care not included 
 Females  Males  Female/Male 
Austria 16  6  2.7 
France 7  4  1.8 
Germany-West 11  6  1.8 
Germany-East 11  5  2.2 
Great Britain  8  4  2.0 
Netherlands 11  5  2.2 
Sweden 10  6  1.7 
Spain 14  7  2.0 
Hungary 20  7  2.9 
Poland 20  11  1.8 
Bulgaria 13  7  1.9 
Russia 23  12  1.9 
 
Source: International Social Survey Programme, 2002 
 
 
I intentionally chose only non-married partners. These partnerships are considered 
to be a modern counterpart of traditional marriage that gives women more autonomy. 
Were married partners included, the females’ shares would be higher.  
The table shows that, in all countries where the question has been asked, women 
report spending about twice as much time on household work as their partners (in 
Austria and Hungary, nearly three times as much). Whatever the employment status of 
the two partners, there is little reason to assume that the dual-carer model in its 
symmetric version is dominant in any one of the countries included in the table. The 
table also shows that the women’s burden is particularly heavy with respect to the 
length of time devoted to household work in some countries, like Hungary, Poland, and 
Russia, where women spend around 20 hours on work in the household that does not 
include child care. This is half of a full-time working week.  
Table 2 gives similar information from another survey. The percentages of the 
responses “both in equal shares” define the proportion of the dual-carer model. Again, 
the female-carer model prevails in all five countries included in the table. The empirical 
data presented in this table are based on household work that did not include child care; 
were the latter included, the ”equal shares” percentage would fall.  
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Table 2:  Responses of females aged 20 to 40 to the question: "Who usually 
does the household work?" in percent  
  Mostly I do  Mostly partner Both in equal shares Others  Total 
Austria 73  4  22  2  100 
Estonia 56  1  43  1  100 
Hungary 73  2  24  2  100 
Lithuania 62  2  34  2  100 
Romania 51  5  37  7  100 
 
Source: BIB (2002)  
 
 
Both tables indicate that, at the macro-level of the whole population, the division 
of household labor between the two partners is favorable for the men, who do a smaller 
share of the work. 
Both datasets were further disaggregated by the employment status of the woman 
(regrettably, this led to a very small number of observations in some cases). Three 
statuses were considered: not in work, full-time employment, and part-time 
employment. The results indicated that men allocate slightly more time for household 
work when their partners work, regardless of whether the woman’s employment is full-
time or part-time. This relative increase of men’s involvement in household work does 
not change the corresponding type of the model; the woman’s share remains high 
compared to the man’s in every one of the three cases.  
This brief empirical review indicates that the woman-carer model is dominant in 
Europe, including in the cases where the woman works. Gender inequality prevails in 
Europe when division of labor in the family is considered, and the “best” dual-
earner/dual-carer model is not dominant anywhere in Europe.  
Hence, if governments in Europe aim to aggressively stimulate a transition to the 
dual-earner/dual-carer model with the goal of increasing fertility, they should make sure 
that the transition encompasses within a short time period a large part of the population 
who at present are classified under the male breadwinner model, or the dual-
earner/woman-carer model.  
 
 
5. Objections  
I raise objections to the view that the sizeable propagation of the dual-earner/dual-carer 
model will lead to a sizeable increase in fertility in a short time period (such as several 
years). For this purpose, I first consider the negative and the positive sides of each 
model from the point-of-view of childrearing.  Philipov: Rostock Debate, first NO: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality 
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A.  The traditional male breadwinner model has the following positive sides:  
•  Better division of labor in the family. The woman is specialized in 
household work and can do it better than the man; the man takes care of 
the family income, and thus the woman and man support each other 
(Becker 1991). 
•  Higher-quality childrearing. It is achieved because the woman stays at 
home and is able to devote more time to her children. From the societal 
point-of-view, childrearing is an investment in the creation of citizens 
with greater knowledge, abilities, and cognition.  
The negative sides include: 
•  Lower female autonomy and self-expression through labor (however, it 
can be argued that the latter is replaced by self-expression through home 
care and childrearing). Women who stay at home may have fewer social 
contacts.  
•  Lower family income 
 
B. Dual-earner/dual-carer  model 
  The positive and negative sides are the inverse of the previous model.  
  The positive sides include: 
•  Achievement of higher female autonomy, higher self-expression of 
women 
•  Wider social contacts at the place of work 
•  Higher family income 
  The negative sides are: 
•  No division of labor, and, hence, lower quality of household work 
•  Least amount of parental time for childrearing 
•  Opportunity costs of childrearing can be high (Becker 1991) 
 
C.  The dual-earner/dual-carer with a part-time work involvement for women is a 
model that is intermediate between models A and B. When compared with model 
A, its positive and negative sides are the same as for model B, with a difference in 
the intensity in their manifestations. For example, family income will be higher 
(but hardly high enough in order to satisfy the greater needs of the family that may 
be expected following the birth of a child).  When compared with model B, the 
positive sides include more time for maternal care, and a lower effect of 
opportunity costs; while the negative sides include restricted opportunities for 
autonomy and self-expression of women, and lower family income. 
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The main premise in this paper is that governments will seek to aggressively 
change the breadwinner model so that fertility will increase. Consider first a stimulated 
change from model (A) to model (B). The positive aspects of model (B) will then be 
expected to contribute to a rise in fertility. Is that to be expected? 
 
•  Achievement of female autonomy, self-expression, and career orientation: these 
values are central in the theoretical discussion about the effect on fertility of 
ideational changes that have occurred over the last couple of decades. They have 
been considered among the causes of lower fertility (Lesthaeghe 1995). This 
positive side for the policy target is expected to have a negative effect on fertility.  
•  Increase in family income through labor participation of women: Is the direct 
income effect or the effect of opportunity costs stronger? We do not have 
sufficient knowledge to determine which effect prevails, and whether the net effect 
is high enough to push women towards the decision to have a child.  
 
Consider a stimulated change from model (A) to model (C). Will part-time 
involvement in labor be satisfactory for the achievement of personal autonomy and self-
realization? Hardly. Working part-time provides considerably fewer opportunities to 
pursue a career in a competitive labor market in which others work full-time. In this 
respect, the research reported in the book edited by Blossfeld and Hakim (1997) is 
indicative. The title of the book suggests that part-time work can lead to a 
marginalization of women on the labor market. Thus the model may lead to specific 
disadvantages for the women.  
This short overview of the models leads to the following objections: 
 
Objection 1: There is no perfect model for the division of labor in the family that 
would promote greater gender equality in such a way that fertility would increase. 
Governments do not have a clear mandate to push aggressively for gender equality in 
order to increase fertility.  
The following observation must be made. Gender policies designed to promote the 
transition to gender equality will benefit from some instruments associated with family 
policies. The introduction of parental leave is an example of such an instrument. As 
discussed in the first section, gender policies and family policies intersect in the models 
for the division of labor. However, the positive effect of similar instruments of family 
policies on fertility should not be assigned to gender equality policies.  
Suppose gender-related policies are implemented with the purpose of enforcing 
one specific model of the division of labor, even though this model is not really 
advantageous. Suppose the implementation is done in an aggressive way, as the title 
states. This sudden change in societal life will have significant macro-economic Philipov: Rostock Debate, first NO: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality 
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consequences. As an example, suppose that the policies aim at a decrease in full-time 
work among women (and/or among men) and its replacement with part-time work. 
Labor supply will swiftly decline, with all the negative consequences for the labor 
market and the economy. Inversely, if women are given policy-assured advantages for 
work, they may wish to change their labor status by moving towards a longer time 
allocation for labor. In the latter case, there will be a swift rise in the supply of labor 
with the macro-level consequences that wages will decrease or unemployment will 
increase. These considerations lead to the next objection.  
 
Objection 2: An aggressive introduction of policies aiming at achieving gender 
equality in order to increase fertility will lead to an imbalance between the supply and 
demand for labor in the labor market. 
The next topic refers to the biological and genetic differences between the two 
sexes. Gender equality is not full symmetry between the two genders because of these 
differences (excluding differences in physical power). What matters for our discussion 
is the hormonal difference, which has a primary importance for the development of 
body and brain structures. Hormones guide the behavior of the individuals and 
reproductive behavior in particular (Udry 1994, 1996).  
Hormones cause sex-differentiated brain structures and behavior. The latter make 
up the foundation of social norms related to gender. Gender norms can therefore be the 
consequence of biological differences. As Udry (1994: p 563) states, “…the behaviors 
related most closely to reproduction and infant survival are the most sex-dimorphic. In 
humans these behaviors form the foundation for the division of labor by sex.”  
This statement indicates that policies aiming at gender equality in order to increase 
fertility cannot disregard the biological differences between the sexes. Gender equality 
is not “sameness;” there are gender differences defined by biology and genetics. There 
are therefore gender norms that have a biological basis. The policies we discuss here 
must therefore either account for this specific gender difference, or be effective against 
the impact of biology and genetics. We do not have the relevant knowledge for the 
design of such policies.  
One genetic aspect related to gender equality in the framework of our argument is 
analyzed by Foster (2000). Motherhood and nurturing are in the genes, and individuals 
have a genetic predisposition towards the relevant behavior. The sex dimorphism is 
clear-cut: the word is about motherhood, not about fatherhood. Gender roles with 
respect to parenthood and nurturing cannot be symmetric because of genetic differences 
between the sexes. Again, a policy that aims to achieve symmetry between motherhood 
and fatherhood must be able to successfully compete with the genetic predisposition of 
human beings. We do not have sufficient relevant knowledge for the design of such a 
policy.  Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 8 
http://www.demographic-research.org  211
In fact, the inverse problem can be put forward: Didn’t an over-gendered human 
nature suppress the genetic predisposition to motherhood? Meaning, is it possible that 
the pursuit of gender equality has gone too far, and has turned into a reason for low 
fertility?   
These views have been expressed explicitly with respect to gender equality in the 
“theory of differences” (Irigaray 1991). As a feminist theory, it emphasizes the special 
and unique position of women as mothers which should not be subject to women’s 
“liberation.”  
 
Objection 3: Governments’ aggressive push towards gender equality in order to 
increase fertility will hit up against innate gender differences that policies will not be 
able to overcome. 
The next topic refers to the following part of the central question: “governments in 
Europe.” The question here is whether the policies targeting gender equality with the 
goal of increasing births should be similar in the different European countries, or 
whether these policies need to be country-specific. 
Figure 1 shows the responses of men and women to a question designed for the 
measurement of a specific gender aspect: the ultimate role of women in society (work 
for pay versus home care and child care). The figure shows an enormous diversity 
among respondents in eight countries in their views about the ultimate role of women. 
While in the Netherlands neither men nor women support the ultimate role being that of 
a homemaker (around 15% agree with the question), in Hungary precisely the inverse is 
observed. The figure also shows that the Central Eastern European countries are clearly 
separated from the Central Western countries with respect to this gender-related value.  
The data indicate a significant diversity in Europe with respect to gender norms 
and values. Hence the application of one country’s policy approach to another country 
could bring about an ineffective policy construction. The policies related to gender 
equality need to be country-specific. Every country needs specific background 
information on gender issues.  
 
Objection 4: Governments in Europe should not use one and the same policy 
approach to achieve gender equality; there is no transnational policy. Governments 
need country-specific research as a basis for their policies. This basis is hardly 
available in most of the European countries.  
Last but not least is the topic related to cultural aspects of gender equality and 
motherhood. Apparently the traditional male breadwinner model has been dominant in 
European societies, and it is woven into societal norms and personal values. A 
transition to a different model of the gender division of labor in the family requires an 
accompanying transition in these norms and values. Ideational changes have been said Philipov: Rostock Debate, first NO: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality 
to be on the way. Indeed, individualization and the desire to achieve personal autonomy 
and fulfillment through labor is gaining ground in nearly the whole of Europe 
(Lestheaghe 1995). However, traditional values around motherhood maintain their 
dominance. Thus motherhood is also a path to fulfillment; and, for mothers, it is 
rewarding to care for their children. Cultural models of work and family are frequently 
discussed in the literature, and it is widely recognized that gender equality has to be 
understood within the cultural environment (Blair-Loy and Frenkel 2005, Hays 1996, 
Pfau-Effinger 2006).  
 
Objection 5: Policies aiming to achieve gender equality should be consistent with 
the cultural environment; the cultural environment changes slowly and hence retards 
actual policy performance, particularly when the policies are introduced aggressively.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Respondents aged 20 to 40, in %, who agree with the statement: 
"Work is good but what most women really want is a home  
and children" 












       Source: BIB (2002) 
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6. Summary and conclusions  
The transition from a male breadwinner model of the division of labor in the household 
to a model with a more gender-equal division of labor is a tendency observed in many 
European societies. Gender equality is a highly appreciated value in contemporary 
democratic societies, and is supported by governmental bodies and the European Union 
through the idea of gender mainstreaming. To this end, progress towards the 
achievement of “a new gender contract” that closely links work, welfare, and family 
(Esping-Andersen 2002) is occurring steadily in European societies, and it will continue 
regardless of the impact on fertility.  
This paper discusses the suggestion that efforts to achieve gender equality be 
extended in order to increase fertility, and that governments should design relevant 
policies, and should implement them in an aggressive manner. I raised five objections 
to this suggestion, which is a bare minimum. The objections can be summarized with in 
one general observation; namely, that an extension of policies aiming to achieve gender 
equality in order to increase fertility is not based on sound research. The aim of such a 
policy—for example, the achievement of a dual-earner/dual-carer model—will not 
necessarily lead to a higher fertility; moreover the aggressiveness in policy 
implementation will hit up against slower changes in values and norms, and will result 
in an imbalance in the supply and demand for labor.  
Governments follow another path that unites the pursuit of gender equality and an 
increase in fertility. To achieve these ends, they can apply policies that promote gender 
equality and family formation (including contemporary pronatalist policies). These two 
policies intersect in the models for division of household labor. Both can support the 
dual-earner/dual-carer model or its variants, with relevant policy instruments. However, 
the policy instruments that can be placed at the intersection point should be carefully 
classified. To this end, both policies should consider the importance of the principle of 
neutrality. Thus, gender neutrality is a basic principle in the construction of policies 
intended to increase the number of births (McDonald 2006). Analogously, policies that 
seek to achieve gender equality should be neutral with respect to fertility change. The 
compatibility of the two policies is clear, and when they both enforce their intersection 
point, the dual-earner/dual-carer model, fertility is likely to increase, at least in the long 
run.  Philipov: Rostock Debate, first NO: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality 
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